Statement of Problem

Populism in the United States has fluctuated greatly. The definition of Populism is highly contested, adding onto misunderstandings of what the concept really means. To understand and measure populism in the United States, the concept must be stripped down to its core theory. Populism has two main elements. The “heartland” is a term adopted by social scientists to refer to a specific group of people considered “ordinary citizens.”¹ People in this case are considered “virtuous, pure, and the backbone of society.”² People orientation is one measure of populism. Populism evokes anti-elite mentalities in addition to people-centrism. The elite are those who take advantage of ordinary people and can include anyone in power; politicians, the media, business people, the wealthy, and those with influence to sway political or cultural mindsets.³ Anti-elitism is the second measure of populism. Populism arises from perceived failures of democratic representation and is a radical response to citizens not trusting in the government due to perceived loss of democratic rights and representation in the system.⁴ A true populist believes they are being suppressed or cheated by the elite in their nation, therefore, the fundamental idea of democracy is at stake, which can produce dire reactions.⁵

Extreme political beliefs often lead to divisions in the citizenry. Populism has generally been split into right-wing and left-wing extremes. However, both extremes of the political

⁴ “To provide the other links in this causal chain, we and a variety of other social scientists have begun to suggest that populism generally is a response to perceived failures of democratic representation (Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels forthcoming; Kriesi 2014; Oliver and Rahn 2016; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014).”
spectrum are displaying the same grievances. Right and left wing populists differ only by who is blamed for causing harm upon the ordinary public. For right-wing populism, notions of anti-elitism and orientation towards ordinary citizens are paired with exclusionism. Exclusionary sentiments arise when a group of people considers the elite unfairly benefitting another group, or their rights are in jeopardy due to a certain outgroup. This outgroup is not considered part of ordinary citizens, even though economically or socially, these outgroups can be quite similar to the populists. Left-wing populism attaches feelings of anti-globalism, how free market expansion can negatively affect the lower class while profiting the wealthy elite, to anti-elitism and people orientation. Both groups display sentiments of unfairness, distrust in the government, for not addressing the corrupt elite accurately or being a part of the elite themselves, and have similar notions of people power.

Populism is a highly contested term to define. The people that comprise populist movements are similarly difficult to determine. In the United States, populist parties evoke feelings about a certain group of people. Historically, the U.S. has witnessed many populist movements and uprisings. The People’s Party, 1892 to 1896, was the first Populist Party, created by farmers and union workers against the “elite” promoting industrialization, from banking to

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railroad construction. Industrialization threatened farmers in the South and West through rapid changes occurring economically and culturally. The People’s Party gained a lot of traction before disassociating when it combined with the Democratic Party under William Jennings Bryan. Since then, many political leaders, and protests and uprisings have been deemed populist. Thomas Jefferson used a lot of populist rhetoric to get elected. Joseph McCarthy utilized right-wing populism and included an exclusionary group, the communists, when communicating with the public. Ross Perot, 1992 and 1996, appealed to right-wing populism, while Ralph Nader, 2000 to 2008 intermittently, utilized leftwing populism, by advocating for consumer protection against large global corporations. The Tea Party movement started after the 2008 economic crises and is considered extreme right wing. The Occupy Wall Street movement also started after the 2008 economic crises but is considered left-wing. The root causes of both movements, the 2008 economic crises, is similar.

Politically, populism is imperative to gage for many reasons. Populism indicates a citizenry in gripe and a decrease of trust in government to address hardships. Understanding the

cause of difficulties felt by citizens and realizing a large percentage of the population holds similar notions, could help eradicate differences and hardships. Since it is in the best interest of political leaders to receive many votes spanning demographic differences, governments could also end up uniting the populous.

It is beneficial to understand who the people that carry populist beliefs are. Is low income or education the main identifier of populist sentiments? Are populist beliefs related to race, sex, gender, or social class? Are those in low income sectors or working class the most likely to be populist? Past surveys and literature have correlated low income levels, low education, Caucasian ethnicity, male gender, and age of 45 or more with the Tea Party and right-wing populist beliefs. Other surveys have shown populism can arise out of various income and education levels, and there are no specific demographic similarities between people in populist groups. The major cause of populist beliefs has historically been economic concerns. Left-wing populist movements have been associated with economic changes that hurt the “ordinary citizens” while benefiting wealthy elite. However, modern Western populist stirrings have been theorized to be the cause of cultural changes by many scholars.

It is difficult to address populist concerns and bridge gaps between political extremes because the people carrying populist sentiments are hard to identify. It is my hypothesis that populism has no demographic distinction. Populism arises from similar grievances felt collectively and separating populist movements into right or left wing creates further divisions. If

the hypothesis is proven accurate, then potential of mediating concerns on either side of the political spectrum arises, which could produce imperative changes in a democracy.

**Literature Review**


Rooduijn and Pauwels measure populism as a thin ideology using classical content analysis and a computer-based content analysis in United Kingdom and Netherlands elections. Measuring populism by the means of content analysis goes beyond the black and white approach of simply stating a political party or leader as populist or not and accounts for the shades of grey between the two extremes. The authors chose election manifestos of political leaders as a measure of populism because they state ideology more clearly than newsletters or speeches. Paragraphs containing people-centrism and anti-elitism were used to measure a populist ideology.

The two statements used by human coders to measure populism included; “Do the authors of the manifesto refer to the people, and do the authors of the manifesto criticize elites?” The computer coding program used single words to measure populism instead of paragraphs since computers cannot comprehend context. The authors developed mostly anti-elitist rhetoric to be the measurement, since almost every political party refers to the people in some way, and the term is generally too broad to necessarily be associated with populism.

The authors identify keywords associated with populist beliefs. These words were used to analyze rhetoric of multiple political parties in the UK and Netherlands to identify if they were populist or not. Rooduijn and Pauwels found human coders tend to be more valid while the

21 See Appendix A
computer produced more reliable results. However, both forms of analysis were statistically valid and reliable enough and accurately identified the usual suspects as populist parties.


Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove try to measure populist, elitist, and pluralist attitudes through a survey conducted with 631 Dutch citizens. The Netherlands was used as the country for this research since there is a strong presence of identified left and right wing political parties and both extremes have gained many votes. Questions that triggered the core of populism were identified. Survey questions address; ‘sovereignty of the people, opposition to the elite, and the Manichean division between “good” and “evil”.’ ‘Ordinary citizens’ are perceived as good while the elite are perceived as evil, introducing a moral element in to the theory. Pluralist and anti-elite attitudes were correlated to populism and questions related to these theories were included in the survey. The authors found ‘right-wing populism is more exclusionary, while left-wing is more inclusive.’ Elitism and populism display a highly positive correlation. The left-wing parties tend to be more skeptical of business people acting as decision makers. These results are consistent with past research and theories.


Scholars from the Central European University set out to measure populist beliefs of ‘chief executives in Central East Europe, Baltic States and Central Asia.’ Manichaean explanations of populism were used once again. The main elements of populism included; ‘a reified will of the people, diabolical elite, a Manichaean cosmology, systemic change, and an “anything goes” attitude.’ Pluralism is identified as a separate ideology in this research, similar

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to socialism or conservatism, since it upholds the view of a “superior elite” and envelopes an “us-versus-them approach.” A famous, ribbon cutting, international, and campaign speech, about 2,000 words in length, by chief executives from 28 European countries were randomly chosen and analyzed by diverse student coders in their respective languages. Holistic grading, where a score is given for a certain ideology represented, was used for coding. The three-point scale for holistic grading ranged from zero to two; with ‘the will of the people’ being the measure for populist rhetoric. Multiple tests for validity and reliability were also conducted. The results were theoretically consistent and the Codebook used for this study was upheld as a valid test to gage populism in political leaders.

Methodology

For the purposes of this study, populism is defined as a thin ideology expressing anti-elite and people-centrist notions. The theoretical framework behind this study is based on coding methodology and definitions of populism. Key words measuring populism were derived from past research conducted by Rooduijn and Pauwels.23 To make the keywords country specific, survey questions by PEW Research Center were correlated to past survey questions, terminology, and coding practices of multiple scholars.24

To identify correlations, or lack thereof, between demographics and populist sentiments, specific independent and dependent variables were identified. Age, income, education, gender, political party ideology, and race are the independent variables in this study. Past research has identified a correlation between age, income level, education, and even gender with populist

23 See Appendix A
24 Studies by Hawkins, Kocijan, Akkerman, Rooduijn, Pauwels, Mudde, and Zaslove were all referenced.
beliefs. Right-wing and left-wing populist distinctions have noted further associations with political parties and race. In the PEW 2016 Election Survey, these variables were identified generation, income level, education completed, party ideology, sex, and race and ethnicity. Figure Two identifies how these variables were measured in the survey.

In accordance with the definition of populism, anti-elite and people-oriented survey questions were distinguished using past research. Four questions from the PEW 2016 Election Survey were identified using keywords. Figure 2 lists the survey questions and their categories. Dependent variable one and two measure people-centric populist ideology, while three and four measure anti-elite sentiments. The dependent variables were also correlated to question used in Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove’s studies that measure populism.

The variables for this project are all nominal, meaning there are multiple categories in each variable with no numeric increases. In SPSS, nominal variables can be analyzed for correlation and association using a cross tabular analysis, chi-square test of good fit, and Cramer’s V Test. A crosstab analysis calculates relationships between the independent and dependent variables in percentage. The chi-square test uses a null hypothesis by assuming variables are independent and uncorrelated. Chi-square is paired with a p-value test for significance, wherein a value below 0.05 deems the null hypothesis invalid. This means, the variables being measured have a strong chance of influencing each other or being correlated.

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27 See Appendix B
28 Figure 1 from the Dutch Study
29 Keywords taken from Figure One
30 See Appendix C
31 See Appendix D
when the p-value value is less than 0.05. While chi-square shows if there is a significant relationship between variables, Cramer’s V explains just how significant that association is. The results were evaluated using a table that lists when an association is not acceptable, weak, moderate, or strong. All three measures were used to distinguish a relationship between each of the four dependent variables and six independent variables.

**Findings**

**Dependent Variable One:**

The first dependent variable was the survey question; “In general, would you say life in America today is better, worse, or about the same as it was fifty years ago for people like you?” The survey allowed respondents to choose between better, worse, about the same, or I don’t know. For the purposes of this study, only the better or worse statements were analyzed in depth.

In general, more females agreed the situation today was worse than males did. However, chi-square renders no correlation between gender and the dependent variable. There is a strong relationship between education and populist sentiments of the situation being worse, however, Cramer’s Value shows there is a very weak association between the two variables. More White non-Hispanics thought the situation was worse today, 54.6%, compared to Black non-Hispanics, 16.7%, Hispanics, 35.4%, and others, 34.7%. Black non-Hispanics mostly thought the situation was better today, 63.2%, or about the same, 20.1%. Race and ethnicity are correlated with populist sentiments of the current situation being worse than 50 years ago, and the association is moderate. For the independent variable income, 54.6% of the middle class, earning $50,000 to $75,000, felt the situation today was much worse than 50 years ago in comparison to other income groups, while 48.4% of those earning $150,000 or more felt today’s situation was better

32 See Appendix E for Cramer’s V Table
compared to other income groups. There is strong correlation between income level and populist sentiments about today’s situation being worse than 50 years ago, however the strength of association between the two variables is fairly nonexistent. Conservative republicans thought today’s situation was much worse in comparison to other party ideologies, while liberal democrats thought today’s situation was much better than 50 years ago, 61.9%, much higher than other ideological leanings in both cases. There is a strong correlation between political party ideology and dependent variable, while a moderate association exists between the two variables.

In comparison to the other generations, the silent and baby boomer generations were highest in considering today’s situation worse, 55.2% and 54.8% respectively, while millennials were highest in considering things better today, 48.2%. There is a strong correlation between age and the current situation, however, the association between the two variables is very weak.

There is no relationship between gender and the dependent variables. Race and party ideology are strongly correlated with the dependent variable. Income level, education completed, and age gaged by generation display a correlation but the association, or significance of that correlation, is weak.

**Dependent Variable Two:**

For dependent variable two, the survey question asked, “In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American people when it comes to making political decisions? A very great deal, a good deal, not very much, or none at all?”

There is no correlation between gender and populist sentiments of trust within the American people to make good political decisions. Those who had acquired less than high school of education had a “very great deal” of trust in the American people to make accurate political decisions, 27.1%, in comparison to the other education levels, while those with some
postgraduate schooling were highest in identifying “no trust at all” in the American people, 25.5%. The majority of people displayed “not very much” trust in the American people to make political decisions representing 51.7% of the total sample. There is a strong correlation between education level and the amount of trust displayed within the American people to make political decisions, however, the association between education and populist trust in very weak. In terms of race, 20.6% of those identifying as an “other” race had no trust at all in the American people in comparison to other ethnicities, while Hispanics, 16.2%, had the most trust in the American people. On the other hand, 54.4% of whites felt “not very much” trust in the American people, representing a slightly larger group with those sentiments in comparison to other ethnicities.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and trust in the American people to make good political decisions, but the association between ethnicity and trust in the American people is low. There is a slight correlation between income and trust in the American people but it not very significant, and there is no real association between income level and populist trust. Moderate liberals and conservatives comprised a slightly greater proportion of “very great deal” of trust in the American people compared to the other ideological leanings. Independents lead the “no trust at all” category with 17.6%, much higher than the other ideological leanings. In general, conservative Republicans displayed slightly less populist trust in comparison to liberal Democrats. There is a strong correlation between party ideology and trust in the American people, but the association between party ideology and populist trust is very weak. There is no correlation between age and populist trust and no significant association between the two variables.

Gender, income level, and age display are not correlated to populist trust. Meaning people that display a lot of populist trust vary in those categories. Race, education, and political
party orientation are significantly correlated to populist trust, however, the association between those variables or strength of the significance of that correlation is low.

**Dependent variable 3**

Dependent variable 3 measured anti-elite sentiments with the survey question; “Government should do more to solve problems OR Government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals.” The survey also allowed an “I don’t know or neither” option.

More females, 63.1%, agreed that business corporations make too much profit in comparison to males, 52.7%. More males, 45.5% agreed corporations make a reasonable amount of profit in comparison to females, 35.4%. There is a strong correlation between gender and the anti-elite sentiments of wealthy elite making too much profit. However, the association between the two variables is not strong. Generally, those with high school education or less agreed more that corporations make too much profit in comparison to other education levels. Those with four years of more of college education, agreed more with the sentiment that businesses make a reasonable amount of money in comparison to those with less education. There is a strong correlation between education levels and anti-wealthy elite sentiments, but the association between education and anti-wealthy elite sentiments is very weak. Many more Black non-Hispanics agreed businesses make too much money in comparison to the other ethnicities, while much more White non-Hispanics felt businesses make a reasonable amount of profit compared to the other ethnicities. Minorities had significantly higher anti-wealthy elite sentiments than Whites. There is a strong correlation between race and anti-wealthy elite sentiments, but a weak association between the two variables. In general, those making $50,000 or less agreed more with the first statement and vice versa for those earning $50,000 or more. There is a strong correlation between income and anti-wealthy elite sentiments, but a weak association exists
between the income and anti-wealthy elite sentiments. Moderate and more liberal Democrats agreed much more with the first statement in comparison to moderate and conservative Republicans, and vice versa. There is a strong correlation between political party ideology and anti-wealthy elite sentiments, and the two variables display a moderate yet significant association. There is no correlation between generation and anti-wealthy elite sentiments.

Gender, income level, education completed, and race are strongly correlated with anti-elite sentiments, however, the association between those demographic identifiers and the dependent variable is weak. Political ideology is strongly correlated with anti-elite sentiments and the significances of that correlation is noteworthy. Meaning, political ideology can serve as a distinguisher of populist anti-elite sentiments. Age is not related to anti-elite notions.

**Dependent variable four:**

Dependent variable also measured anti-elite sentiments by asking survey takers to choose the statements; “The economic system in this country unfairly favors powerful interests OR the economic system in this country is generally fair to most Americans.” The survey also allowed an “I don’t know or neither option,” which was not analyzed for the purposes of this study.

More females, 70.9%, think the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests in comparison to males, 63.5% feel that way. There is a strong correlation between gender and anti-elite sentiments, but the association between the two variables is really weak. In general, those with less education thought economic system was generally fair for the people by a greater proportion compared to those with a Bachelor’s degree or more of education. There is a strong correlation between education levels and anti-elite sentiments towards the elite benefitting over ordinary people, but the association between the variables is very weak. Proportionally,

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33 See Figures and Results Section
Hispanics lead in feeling like the economic system is generally fair to most Americans with 38.5% about 6% higher than White non-Hispanics, which were the second group to agree with the second statement, by 32.7%. There is a strong correlation between race and populist sentiments of an unfair economic system that favors elites, while a very weak fairly nonexistent association exists between the two variables. The middle class, ranging from $20,000 to $50,000, displayed proportionally higher anti-elite sentiments in comparison to other income levels. There is a significant correlation between income level and economic anti-elite sentiments. However, a very weak fairly nonexistent association exists between the two variables. In terms of party ideology, 87.3% of Liberal Democrats believe the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests, while 50.2% Conservative Republicans hold the same beliefs. Generally, most of the sample, 67.2%, believes the economic system unfairly favors elites. There is a strong correlation between party ideology and anti-elite sentiments, and a moderate association between the two. Generally, younger generations proportionally agree more that the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests, with Millennials comprising the highest percentage, 71.8%. Age or generation is correlated with sentiments of elites benefiting unfairly or anti-elite sentiments, but the association between the two variables is very weak and fairly nonexistent.

Gender, income level, education completed, race, and age are all strongly correlated to anti-elite sentiments, however, the association between these variables with the dependent variable is weak. Party ideology is significantly related to anti-elite sentiments.

**Discussion**

The research proves my hypothesis to be accurate. While demographic identifiers are correlated to populist beliefs, the association between the two is too weak to suggest populism is concentrated in certain demographic groups.
It is important to consider party ideology was the only demographic identifier related to anti-elite beliefs, which varied in relation to extreme conservatism and liberalism. The only major difference between the two ends of the political spectrum was that more liberals had anti-wealthy elite sentiments than Republicans, as shown by dependent variable four. Right-wing populists have been known to be distrusting of the government who they see as the elite. The survey question included individuals alongside businesses on the second option that more Conservative Republicans agreed with. This complicates populist distinctions because businesses are often considered the elite and individuals are thought of as ordinary citizens. While this question was meant for gaging how many people saw the government as the elite, it is not a comprehensive measure of populist beliefs. Another outlier was race in dependent variable one. There are obvious reasons for why people identifying as Black non-Hispanics do not agree that things today are worse than 50 years ago. The question does correlate people-centric notions with current political issues, by asking how things are ‘for people like you,’ but it is not a comprehensive measure of populism.

Overall, demographic identifiers are not related to populism. With rising right-wing and left-wing populist groups, suggesting there are no demographic similarities points to a rise in distrust of those considered the elite and a rally behind more people centric political and economic policies in the general public. If citizen grievances are similar, span across the political spectrum, and have no demographic correlations, future efforts could be made to unite people using populist beliefs and understand concerns better. Results like these on a larger scale could unite the public on specific economic and social policies. If people have the same concerns, pushing legislators to pass policies addressing those concerns could bridge a growing bipartisan divide witnessed in America.
Future studies could be comprised of surveys asking where people stand on populist beliefs without using keywords that have been connected to the extreme right and left. For example, asking about wealthy elite without using notions challenging the free market such as “the government is doing things better left to businesses and individuals.” Another interesting finding of this study is that people generally distrust the ability for American people to make political decisions while believing the same about the elite. Future studies can formulate questions that probe into people’s distrust in the citizenry more. Additionally, surveys could be conducted gaging which kind of elites people distrust most and what people’s definition of “the elite” is. This study was not a comprehensive measure of populism in the United States because questions must be people-oriented and anti-elitist. The questions in this study were worded in a manner where those two notions were not the only forces in play. Meaning, there are other obvious reasons why certain groups of people might agree or disagree with the questions asked. Future studies can formulate specific questions that gage populism accurately.

Conclusion

Populism identifies two imperative things for politics; there is a grievance felt by the citizenry and trust in the government to address said concern is decreasing. This study attempted to gage if there were demographic correlations within those who have populist sentiments, so grievances can be addressed and potentially solved collectively. The hypothesis, that demographics is not what explains populism, was proven accurate. Populism is a thin ideology where the citizenry displays people-centric and anti-elite sentiments. In a democracy, a populous that is anti-elite but not people centric, is worrisome. Social and political groupings will never wholly disperse, but, if grievances and distrust are felt by a large percent of the population, something negative could produce unity through solutions to address hardships.
Appendixes

Appendix A Figure One: Dictionary of the computer-based content analysis keywords:

The Netherlands:


The United Kingdom:

Exclusionism: alien, asylum*, black*, illegal*, imam, immigr*, islam*, muslim*, refugee*

Appendix B Figure Two: Independent variables table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables:</th>
<th>Measures:</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income Level</td>
<td>Less than $10,000</td>
<td>10 to under $20,000</td>
<td>20 to under $30,000</td>
<td>30 to under $40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Completed</td>
<td>Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling)</td>
<td>High school incomplete (NO diploma)</td>
<td>High school graduate (Diploma or GED certificate)</td>
<td>Some college, no degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Generation)</td>
<td>Greatest and older (~1928)</td>
<td>Silent (1928-45)</td>
<td>Boomer (1946-64)</td>
<td>Xer (1965-80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>Conservative Republican</td>
<td>Moderate-Liberal Republican</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Conservative Moderate Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>White non-Hispanic</td>
<td>Black non-Hispanic</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix C: Table of dependent variables and their categories of populist rhetoric:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.6. In general, would you say life in America today is better, worse, or about the same as it was fifty years ago for people like you?</td>
<td>People-Centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.8. In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American people when it comes to making political decisions?</td>
<td>People-Centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A very great deal, a good deal, not very much, or none at all?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q50b. Business corporations make too much profit OR Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit.</td>
<td>Anti-Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.58m. The economic system in this country unfairly favors powerful interests OR The economic system in this country is generally fair to most Americans</td>
<td>Anti-Elite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D: Survey questions from Netherlands Study:35

Table 1. Items Measuring Populist, Pluralist, and Elitist Attitudes.

| POP1 The politicians in the Dutch parliament need to follow the will of the people. |
| POP2 The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions. |
| POP3 The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people. |
| POP4 I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician. |
| POP5 Elected officials take too much and take too little action. |
| POP6 Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil. |
| POP7 What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles. |
| POP8 Interest groups have too much influence over political decisions. |
| PLU1 In a democracy it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints. |
| PLU2 It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups. |
| PLU3 Diversity limits my freedom. |
| E1 Politicians should lead rather than follow the people. |
| E2 Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to successful business people. |
| E3 Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts. |

*Formulate in reverse of the original statement.

Appendix E: Cramer’s V Table to measure association:36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF ASSOCIATION</th>
<th>Verbal Description</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>No Relationship</td>
<td>Knowing the independent variable does not help in predicting the dependent variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00 to .15</td>
<td>Very Weak</td>
<td>Not generally acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.10 to .20</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Minimally acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.20 to .25</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.25 to .30</td>
<td>Moderately Strong</td>
<td>Desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30 to .35</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Very Desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.35 to .40</td>
<td>Very Strong</td>
<td>Extremely Desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.40 to .50</td>
<td>Worrisingly Strong</td>
<td>Either an extremely good relationship or the two variables are measuring the same concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 to .99</td>
<td>Redundant</td>
<td>The two variables are probably measuring the same concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Perfect Relationship</td>
<td>If we the know the independent variable, we can perfectly predict the dependent variable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures and Results:

Figure One: Interpretation of Cross tabular Analysis, Chi-square test, and Cramer’s V for each dependent and independent variable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep 1 Q6</th>
<th>Dep 2 Q8</th>
<th>Dep3 Q50b</th>
<th>Dep5 Q58m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>39% of males felt that the situation in America was better than 50 years ago while 36.7% of females agreed with this statement. 45% of males felt that the situation was worse than 50 years ago while 48.4% of females agreed with this. x2= 2.490, p&lt; .288. Cramer’s V= 0.034 which is very weak. Gender does not influence populist sentiments of the current situation being better or worse.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slightly more males, 9.3%, had a “very great deal” of trust in the American people to make political decisions compared to women, 8%. More females, 53.8%, had “not very much” faith in the American people in comparison to males, 49.8%. x2= 7.295, df= 3, p&lt; 0.063. There is no correlation between gender and populist sentiments of trust within the American people to make good political decisions. Cramer’s V= 0.057, the association between gender and populist trust is nonexistent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More females, 63.1%, agreed that business corporations make too much profit in comparison to males, 52.7%. More males, 45.5% agreed corporations make a reasonable amount of profit in comparison to females, 35.4%. x2= 23.963, df= 2, p&lt; 0.000. There is a strong correlation between gender and the anti-elite sentiments of wealthy elite making too much profit. However, since Cramer’s V= 0.105, the association between the two variables is not strong.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More females, 70.9%, think the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests in comparison to males, 63.5% feel that way. More males, 35.2%, think the economic system is generally fair to most Americans compared to females, 28% feel that way. x2= 13.642, df= 2, p&lt; 0.001. There is a strong correlation between gender and anti-elite sentiments. Cramer’s V= 0.078, the association between the two variables is really weak.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>There were more people who found generally, those with high school</td>
<td>Those who had acquired less with high school</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People with two year associates</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
the current situation worse, 46.6%, than before not better, 37.9%. Those with high school education thought the situation was worse, 49.8%, were only slightly higher than those who thought it was better, 35.1%. Those with some postgraduate or professional schooling found the current situation worse, 61.4%, compared to other education levels, average of 50%. \( x^2 = 42.252 \) with 14 df, \( p \leq 0.000 \). The null hypothesis is inaccurate, **there is a strong relationship between education and populist sentiments of the situation being worse.** Cramer's \( V = 0.101 \) which is weak meaning the strength of association between the two variables is weak.

<p>| than high school of education had a “very great deal” of trust in the American people to make accurate political decisions, 27.1%, in comparison to the other education levels, while those with some postgraduate schooling were highest in identifying “no trust at all” in the American people, 25.5%. The majority of people displayed “not very much” trust in the American people to make political decisions representing 51.7% of the total sample. ( x^2 = 65.838 ), df = 21, ( p \leq 0.000 ). <strong>There is a strong correlation between education level and the amount of trust displayed within the American people to make political decisions.</strong> Cramer’s ( V = 0.10 ), the association between education and trust displayed within the American people to make political decisions.  |
| education or less agreed more that corporations make too much profit in comparison to other education levels. Those with a four year college degree or more tended to agree more with the sentiment that businesses make a reasonable amount of money in comparison to those with less education. The sample as a whole believed businesses make too much money, 57.5%. ( x^2 = 27.921 ), df = 14, ( p \leq 0.015 ). <strong>There is a strong correlation between education levels and anti-wealthy elite sentiments.</strong> Cramer's ( V = 0.080 ), the association between education and anti-wealthy elite sentiments are very weak. |
| degrees stood out proportionally to the rest of the education levels with 74.4% of associate's degree earners believing the economics system unfairly favors powerful interests. In general, those with less education thought the economic system was generally fair for the people by a greater proportion compared to those with a Bachelor's degree or more of education. A greater proportion of the overall sample, 66.6%, believed the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests. ( x^2 = 30.773 ), df = 14, ( p \leq 0.006 ). <strong>There is a strong correlation between education levels and anti-elite sentiments towards the elite benefitting over ordinary people.</strong> Cramer’s ( V = 0.083 ), there is a very weak association between education and anti-elite sentiments. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>populist trust in very weak.</th>
<th>anti-elite sentiments.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indep 3 Ethnicity</td>
<td>More White non-Hispanics thought the situation was worse today, 54.6%, compared to Black non-Hispanics, 16.7%, Hispanics, 35.4%, and others, 34.7%. Black non-Hispanics mostly thought the situation was better today, 63.2%, or about the same, 20.1%. $\chi^2 = 151.739$, df = 6, $p \leq 0.000$. Cramer’s $V = 0.192$ means there is moderate association between the two variables. Race and ethnicity is correlated with populist sentiments of the current situation being worse than 50 years ago.</td>
<td>20.6% of those identifying as an “other” race/ethnicity had no trust at all in the American people in comparison to other ethnicities, while Hispanics, 16.2%, had the most trust in the American people. 54.4% of whites felt “not very much” trust in the American people, representing a slightly larger group with those sentiments in comparison to other ethnicities. $\chi^2 = 43.215$, df = 9, $p \leq 0.000$. There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and trust in the American people to make good political decisions. Cramer’s $V = 0.081$, the association between ethnicity and trust in the American people is low.</td>
<td>Much more Black non-Hispanics agreed businesses make too much money in comparison to the other ethnicities, while much more White non-Hispanics felt businesses make a reasonable amount of profit compared to the other ethnicities. Minorities had significantly higher anti-wealthy elite sentiments than Whites. $\chi^2 = 53.749$, df = 6, $p \leq 0.000$. There is a strong correlation between race/ethnicity and anti-wealthy elite sentiments. Cramer’s $V = 0.112$, there is a weak association between the two variables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep 4 Income</td>
<td>54.6% of the middle class, earning $50,000 to $75,000, felt By about 5%, those earning $50,000 or less comprised more</td>
<td>In general, those making $50,000 or less agreed more with the first</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The middle class ranging from $20,000 to $50,000</td>
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Note: $\chi^2$ denotes the chi-square statistic, $df$ refers to degrees of freedom, and $p$ is the p-value. Cramer’s $V$ is a measure of association strength.
the situation today was much worse than 50 years ago in comparison to other income groups. 48.4% of those earning $150,000 or more felt today’s situation was better compared to other income groups. $x^2 = 29.386, df = 16, p < 0.021. Cramer’s V = 0.88. **There is strong correlation between income level and populist sentiments about today’s situation being worse than 50 years ago, however the strength of association between the two variables is fairly nonexistent.**

of the “very great deal” of trust in the American people category in comparison to those earning $50,000 or more. Across the income levels, more people, 52.2%, fit into the “not very much” trust in the American people category, while only 25.6% of the sample displayed “a good deal” of populist trust. Also, a greater percentage of the sample, 13.8%, held “no trust at all” in the American people compared to “a very great deal” of trust, 8.4%. $x^2 = 24.181, df = 24, p < 0.451. **There is a slight correlation between income and trust in the American people but it not very significant.** Cramer’s V = 0.063, **there is no real association between income level and populist trust.**

statement and vice versa for those earning $50,000 or more. $x^2 = 90.132, df = 16, p < 0.000. **There is a strong correlation between income and anti-wealthy elite sentiments.** Cramer’s V = 0.150, **there is a weak association between the income and anti-wealthy elite sentiments.**

displayed proportionally higher anti-elite sentiments in comparison to other income levels. Those earning $10,000 thought the economic system generally favors the American people by 36.5% this group was juxtaposed by those earning $150,000 or more, who also agreed most with the second statement by 41%. $x^2 = 26.452, df = 16, p < 0.048. **There is a moderate correlation between income level and economic anti-elite sentiments.** Cramer’s V = 0.081, **there is a very weak fairly nonexistent association between the two variables.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep 5 Party Ideology</th>
<th>Conservative republicans thought today’s situation was much worse in</th>
<th>Moderate liberals and conservatives comprised a slightly greater</th>
<th>Moderate and more liberal Democrats agreed much more with the first statement in</th>
<th>87.3% of Liberal Democrats believe the economic system unfairly favors</th>
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<td>Conservative republicans thought today’s situation was much worse in</td>
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<td>87.3% of Liberal Democrats believe the economic system unfairly favors</td>
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comparison to other party ideologies with 70%, while liberal democrats thought today’s situation was much better than 50 years ago, 61.9%, much higher than other ideological leanings in both cases. More independents thought today’s situation was worse, 48.2%. Conservatives thought the situation was generally worse, 54.8%, while Liberals thought it was better, 52%. x² = 222.901, df = 8, p < 0.000. There is a strong correlation between political party ideology and the current situation compared to 50 years ago, while there is a moderate association between the two variables. Cramer’s V = 0.237.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep 6 Age/Generation</th>
<th>In comparison to the other generations, the silent and baby boomer generations were highest in</th>
<th>On the extremes, the Silent and Baby Boomer generations display a &quot;very great deal&quot; of trust in the</th>
<th>In general, the older generations agreed much more with the second statement, that businesses make a reasonable amount of money,</th>
<th>Generally, younger generations proportionally agree more that the economic system unfairly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

powerful interests, while 50.2% Conservative Republicans hold the same beliefs. Generally, most of the sample, 67.2%, believes the economic system unfairly favors elites. x² = 130.174, df = 8, p < 0.000. There is a strong correlation between party ideology and anti-elite sentiments. Cramer’s V = 0.176, there is a moderate association between party ideology and anti-elite sentiments.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Considering today's situation worse, 55.2% and 54.8% respectively, while millennials were highest in considering things better today, 48.2%. $x^2 = 77.076$, df = 8, $p &lt; 0.000$. Cramer’s $V = 0.136$. There is a strong correlation between age and the current situation, however, the association between the two variables is very weak.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People more so than the other generations. On the opposite end, Millennials lead in the “no trust at all” category with 17.5%, proportionally slightly higher in comparison to the other generations. In general, the older generations, born before 1965. $x^2 = 18.961$, df = 12, $p &lt; 0.089$. There is no correlation between age and populist trust and no significant association between the two variables. Cramer’s $V = 0.089$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the younger generations felt businesses make too much. $x^2 = 14.770$, df = 8, $p &lt; 0.064$, Cramer’s $V = 0.058$. There is no correlation between generation and anti-wealthy elite sentiments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favors powerful interests, with Millennials comprising the highest group with 71.8%. The sample in general agrees more that the elite benefit from the economy, 66.8%, instead of most Americans. $x^2 = 16.927$, df = 8, $p &lt; 0.031$. Age or generation is correlated with sentiments of elites benefiting unfairly or anti-elite sentiments. Cramer’s $V = 0.062$, the association between the two variables is very weak and fairly nonexistent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dependent Variable Two Figures:

Q.8. In general, would you say life in America today is better, worse, or about the same as it was fifty years ago for people like you?

Q.6. In general, would you say life in America today is better, worse, or about the same as it was fifty years ago for people like you?

Q.8. In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American people when it comes to making political decisions? A very great deal, a good deal, not very much, or none at all.

Q.8. In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American people when it comes to making political decisions? A very great deal, a good deal, not very much, or none at all.
Q.8. In general, how much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American people when it comes to making political decisions? A very great deal, a good deal, not very much, or none at all?
Dependent Variable: Three Figures:

Q.58I. Government should do more to solve problems
OR Government is doing too many things better left
to businesses and individuals

Q.58I. Government should do more to solve problems
OR Government is doing too many things better left
to businesses and individuals

EDUC: What is the highest level of school you have completed or
the highest degree you have received?
- Less than high school
- Grades 1-4 (or no formal schooling)
- High school incomplete
- Grades 9-11 or Grade 12 with NO diploma
- High school graduate
- Grade 12 with diploma or GED certificate
- Some college, no degree
- Includes community college
- Two-year associate degree
- From a college or university
- Four-year college or
- University degree Bachelor’s degree
- Graduate or professional school, no
- Postgraduate degree (e.g.,
- Some graduate school
- Postgraduate or professional degree,
- Including master’s,
- Doctorate, medical or law degree (e.g., MD, DDS, PhD)
- MD, JD, or

Q.58I. Government should do more to solve problems
OR Government is doing too many things better left
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Q.58I. Government should do more to solve problems
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Q.58I. Government should do more to solve problems
OR Government is doing too many things better left
to businesses and individuals
Dependent Variable Four Figures:

Q.58m. The economic system in this country unfairly favors powerful interests OR The economic system in this country is generally fair to most Americans

Q.58i. Government should do more to solve problems OR Government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals

Bar Chart

INCOME: Last year, that is in 2015, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the right category. [READ]

- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 to under $20,000
- $20,000 to $30,000
- $30,000 to $40,000
- $40,000 to $50,000
- $50,000 to $75,000
- $75,000 to $100,000
- $100,000 or over
- $150,000 or more

Q.58l. Government should do more to solve problems OR Government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals

Bar Chart

EDUC. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

- Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling)
- High school/Incomplete
- High school Graduate
- Grades 9-11 or Grade 12 with GED Diploma
- High school Graduate
- Grades 12 with options or GED certificate
- Some college, no degree (e.g., associate degree, high school graduate)
- College degree with master's degree (e.g., BA, MA, MBA, PhD, MD, JD, etc.)
- Professional degree (e.g., medical, law, etc.)
- Some postgraduate or professional degree (e.g., some graduate school)
- Postgraduate or professional degree (e.g., master's, medical, or law degree (e.g., MA, MB, PhD, MD, JD, etc.)
Q.58m. The economic system in this country unfairly favors powerful interests OR The economic system in this country is generally fair to most Americans

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INCOME. Last year, that is in 2015, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the right category. [READ]

- Less than $10,000
- $10 to under $20,000
- $20 to under $30,000
- $30 to under $40,000
- $40 to under $50,000
- $50 to under $75,000
- $75 to under $150,000
- $150,000 or more
References


